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a balance sheet […] which attributes all gains and costs of in-
ventions, wars, demographic and economic crises to the respective 
generation according to the causative principle. This is simply 
impossible.” 7
If the definition of intergenerational justice is a field of study on 
its own, it is hardly surprising that measuring intergenerational 
justice is far from being trivial. For the “Intergenerational Jus-
tice Index”, for example, Vanhuysse combines several economic 
measures and a measure for the ecological footprint.8 The “Euro-
pean  Intergenerational Fairness Index”9 also applies several mainly 
economic measures from housing costs to expenditure for R&D 
to assess the position of young people. Both studies succeed in 
providing a comprehensive insight into the complex issue of inter-
generational justice. However, complementing these indices with 
an in-depth analysis of single measures may be worthwhile. Take 
for example government debt, which enters both indices. Feldstein 
already pointed out in 1974 that official debt is not able to reflect 
unfunded liabilities arising in pay-as-you-go financed social secu-
rity systems. Following this line of thought, Auerbach et al. devel-
oped the method of Generational Accounting in the late 1980s:
“Regardless of their true fiscal policies, governments can label 
their policies so as to report any time path of deficits or surpluses 
they want. The fundamental problem with deficit accounting is 
that the deficit does not represent the answer to a well-posed eco-
nomic question. Generational Accounting, in contrast, attempts 
to answer two well-defined economic questions. First, what is the 
magnitude of the fiscal burden being left for future generations by 
current policy, and second, how does a change in fiscal policy alter 
the intergenerational distribution of welfare?” 10
At the core, Generational Accounting assumes that taxes paid mi-
nus transfers received over the remaining lifetime of both current 
and future generations have to equal government (explicit and im-
plicit) debt. Thereby, Generational Accounting is not able to give a 
normative statement on intergenerational justice. It can only high-
light fiscal consequences of current policies.11 Thus, for the field 
of public finance, Generational Accounting can detect whether to-
day’s government policy burdens current generations with a heavier 
load than current generations. Therefore the focus of this paper can 
probably be titled intergenerational balance and should be under-
stood as one attempt (among many) to approach the vast topic of 
intergenerational justice. Generational Accounting can prove very 
helpful, e.g. by designing the following thought experiment:
Only very few countries are in the favourable situation to 
be able to generate fiscal surpluses. Thus for most coun-
tries the issue of intergenerational justice is much more 
skewed towards a battle between the generations.
bstract: In this paper we apply the method of Generational 
Accounting to analyse whether today’s government policy 
burdens future generations with a heavier load than current 
generations. We analyse pay-as-you-go pension systems and their reforms 
in Norway, Poland and Germany. Our results show that, through these 
reforms, pension systems in all three countries became more intergener-
ationally balanced as the implicit debt to be paid by future generations 
was reduced. However, the burden is shared differently: in Norway 
current pensioners have to contribute to enhancing the financial sus-
tainability of the pension system while Poland and Germany seem to 
protect current pensioners at the expense of younger generations.
Keywords: Generational Accounting, Pension Reform, International 
Comparison, Sustainability, Intergenerational Redistribution
Introduction1
In the light of ageing societies, the relationship between current 
and future generations is a hot topic not only in political debates 
and TV talk shows but also in social science research.2 While it is 
often presumed that ageing societies act to the detriment of future 
generations, there are also examples showing a balanced situation. 
In Norway, the so-called “Government Pension Fund Global” was 
established in 1990. Its aim is 
“to support long-term considerations in the government’s spend-
ing of petroleum revenues, as well as savings to finance pension 
expenditure under the National Insurance Scheme. Sound long-
term management will help ensure that Norway’s petroleum 
wealth can benefit both current and future generations.” 3 
However, only very few countries are in the favourable situation 
of being able to generate fiscal surpluses. Thus for most countries 
the issue of intergenerational justice is much more skewed towards 
a battle between the generations. However, to be able to answer 
the question about how an intergenerationally just society should 
look, a definition of the term intergenerational justice is necessary. 
In recent decades, a growing branch of literature has developed 
around this research question.4 In the field of economics, the most 
prominent view of intergenerational justice was probably estab-
lished by Rawls:
“The correct principle, then, is one the members of any generation 
(and so all generations) would adopt as the principle they would 
want preceding generations to have followed,[…]. Since no gen-
eration knows its place among the generations, this implies that 
all later generations, including the present one, are to follow it.” 5, 6
Börsch-Supan, however, raises the objection that
“a properly defined concept of generational justice has to set up 
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Therefore we compare in this paper Norway, Poland and Germa-
ny to evaluate if such reforms – drastic or more subtle – really 
alleviate the demographically induced burden of pay-as-you-go 
type public retirement systems for future generations and are thus 
able to restore (or at least enhance) intergenerational balance.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we briefly describe our 
chosen set of countries with a focus on their demographic devel-
opment and the pension reforms analysed. Then we describe in 
detail our methodology, as well as its theoretical and empirical 
weaknesses. We then provide the outcome of our Generational 
Accounts for the three pension systems and their reforms, and 
discuss them in detail. Thereby, the focus is on whether these re-
forms improved intergenerational balance and how the burden 
imposed by these reforms is shared between different generations. 
The paper finishes with a conclusion and outlook.
Demographic developments in comparison
An international comparison of all relevant demographic develop-
ments and their parameters would be a study of its own. Therefore 
we will focus on the factors of life expectancy and fertility, which 
are the two most important driving forces of demographic devel-
opment.
All three countries considered have faced an increase in life expec-
tancy during past decades and this development is very likely to 
be continued. While numbers differ only slightly for Norway and 
Germany, they still lag behind for Poland. In 2010 life expectancy 
at birth was only 80.1 years for women and 71.7 years for men in 
Poland (see Table 1). In contrast, life expectancy at birth was 83.1 
(82.7) years for women and 78.7 (77.6) years for men in Norway 
(Germany) in 2010. According to projections by Eurostat (2011), 
in 2060 life expectancy for men will be 82.4 years in Poland, 84.8 
years in Germany and 85.2 years in Norway. Numbers for women 
will amount to 87.9 years in Poland, 88.9 years in Germany and 
89.2 years in Norway. While life expectancy will still be shortest 
in Poland, the country is projected to catch up remarkably.
Table 1: Life-expectancy at birth17
As regards the development of fertility rates, there are some rec-
ognisable trends in all three countries: for example, low fertility 
rates during the Second World War, and overall high fertility rates 
during the baby boom of the 1960s. While all three countries 
faced sharp declines in fertility rates following the baby boom, 
a quick and substantial recovery took place only in Norway. In 
2010 fertility rates were still high in Norway with 1.9 children per 
woman, whereas Poland and Germany reached a number of 1.4 
children per woman only. 
Another driving force of demographic development is migra-
tion.18 Again, patterns differ considerably between Norway, Po-
land and Germany. In Norway, net migration was positive in 
“By what percentage would one need immediately and perma-
nently to raise income taxes so as to be able (in conjunction with 
other tax receipts) to pay for the government’s projected future 
expenditures and its current net financial liabilities and never 
have to raise taxes again?”12
Ultimately, the inventors of Generational Accounting assess the 
merits of their method as follows:
“Generational accounting makes us look ahead. It makes us refine 
our long-term fiscal projections. It makes us consider the rising 
cost of policy procrastination. It makes us ask tough questions 
about who will pay the government’s bills. It makes us address 
economic issues, rather than play accounting games. And it makes 
us acknowledge the extent to which we are expropriating our chil-
dren’s resources by accumulating fiscal liabilities, be they implicit 
or explicit”13.
In the following, the method of Generational Accounting is ap-
plied to assess implications of pension reforms in different coun-
tries. When it comes to the question of intergenerational redistri-
bution, pension schemes that follow the pay-as-you-go principle 
play an important role for several reasons. First of all, in many 
European countries public pension expenditure is one of the 
largest budgetary items of public finances, amounting to almost 
12% of GDP in 2013 (EU28 average).14 Moreover, pay-as-you-
go pension systems explicitly require a contract between different 
generations. Thereby, this contract is not a contract in the juridi-
cal sense, but rather describes rights and duties between different 
generations. It aims at smoothing income over the life cycle.15 
Finally, many pension systems have undergone severe changes 
in the past two decades. In the second half of the past century 
pension systems in Europe were often characterised by generous 
regulations both regarding the benefits paid out as well as the time 
which could be spent in retirement. Towards the end of the centu-
ry and in the gloomy light of ageing populations it turned out that 
these systems would fail to be as generous with future generations. 
Even more, it became evident that future generations would be 
burdened by past benefits being too generous.16 Slowly but sure-
ly, pension reforms were implemented in almost every European 
country. Countries like Norway and Poland switched to a notion-
al defined contribution (NDC) system while other countries – at 
least from a legal perspective – reformed their existing systems 
more gradually, e.g. Germany. The Norwegian system is chosen 
here because the entire pension system was changed only recently, 
in 2011, from a quasi-NDC system to the real NDC type. The 
Polish pension reform was quite similar to the Norwegian one; 
however, the change was more severe, has started about ten years 
earlier, and reforms are still in progress. While pension reform 
meant a complete change of the existing systems in Norway and 
Poland, reforms were more gradual in Germany. Nevertheless, the 
changes were not less far-reaching than in the other two countries. 
Towards the end of the century and in the gloomy light 
of ageing populations it turned out that pension 
systems would fail to be as generous with future genera-
tions.[…] Slowly but surely, pension reforms were imple-
mented in almost every European country.
 Male  Female
 2010 2060 2010 2060
Norway 78.7 85.2 83.1 89.2
Poland 71.7 82.4 80.1 87.9
Germany 77.6 84.8 82.7 88.9
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every single year from 1990 until 2010. The situation is almost 
similar in Germany; however, the crude rate of net migration per 
1,000 inhabitants is overall lower and it turned negative in 2008 
and 2009. In contrast, emigration was almost always higher than 
immigration in the case of Poland between 1990 and 2010.19
As demographic development is mainly formed by the fac-
tors  described above, future trends will be quite different in the 
three countries. This can be seen in Figure 1: today, Poland has 
the lowest proportion of elderly people, followed by Norway. 
While population ageing will take place in all three countries, 
the development will be severest in Poland. In 2060 Norway will 
be the country with the lowest proportion of elderly people. In 
 contrast, about one-third of the population will be 65 years and 
older in Germany and Poland. Over the coming decades, the 
share of elderly people will rise sharply in Poland and is expected 
to be more than two and a half times larger in 2060 than it was 
in 2010. 
Figure 1: Share of population aged 65 and above in 2010 and 206020
Reforming pension systems
Norway
The reformed Norwegian pension system started to take effect in 
2011.21 The benefit plan of the new system consists of a “guaran-
tee pension” and a public earnings-related pension system.22
For a person to be eligible for a guarantee pension a period of 
residence in the country of at least three years is required. To get 
the full amount, 40 years of residence are necessary. The guarantee 
pension cannot be claimed before the age of 67. The earnings-re-
lated pension (called “income pension”) is counted against the 
guarantee pension. The guarantee pension is indexed annually in 
accordance with wage growth minus the effect of the life expec-
tancy adjustment (see below).
The new public earnings-related pension system is of NDC type. 
The pension system is a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) scheme fully inte-
grated with the state budget and financed by a mixture of general 
taxation and employer and employee social security contribu-
tions. Each year an amount equivalent to 18.1% of earnings up to 
a threshold is credited to an individual notional pension account. 
The accumulated holdings on these accounts are indexed annually 
in step with average wage growth. Furthermore, there are several 
credits, e.g. for periods of raising a child, caregiving or military 
services. Retiring is possible between the age of 62 and the age 
of 75. When a person retires, entitlements are converted into a 
lifetime pension payment. The calculation is based on the age at 
retirement entry and the average life expectancy of the respective 
cohort. The take-up of pension benefits can be combined freely 
with full-time or part-time employment. Income pension is in-
dexed annually according to wage growth minus 0.75 percentage 
points.23
Poland
Currently, the Polish private sector pension system is in a tran-
sition phase after the reform of 1999, which changed it from a 
defined benefit scheme to an NDC scheme.24 Until 2011, the new 
scheme applied to all workers born after 1968 and was designed 
as follows: Contribution is set at 19.52% of gross earnings, with 
payment equally split between employers and employees. 12.22% 
is credited to individual accounts at the central insurance institu-
tion, with a rate of return equal to the growth of the wage sum of a 
respective year after controlling for inflation. The remaining 7.3% 
is invested into private funds with an individual and variable mar-
ket rate of return.25 After retirement, account values are converted 
into an annuity which is based on the average unisex life expec-
tancy of the age group at the age of retirement. Employees born 
between 1949 and 1969 are covered by the reformed system, but 
they can decide whether or not to participate in the funded part of 
the new scheme. In contrast, people born before 1949 still receive 
their pension from the former defined benefit scheme. If pension 
benefits fall below a defined threshold, there is a supplement paid 
out of tax accounts. In general, existing pensions are indexed with 
the inflation rate plus 20% of real wage growth.
Mainly due to public budget constraints, the government changed 
the proportions of contributions transferred to the different pil-
lars in May 2011. The Funded Defined Contribution (FDC) part 
was lowered to 2.3%, with the remaining 5% going to a second 
NDC scheme. Contributions to the funded part were legislated to 
rise again until they will reach 3.5% sometime after 2017.
In 2012 the statutory retirement age for men and women insured 
in the NDC/FDC system was legislated to rise gradually from 
60 to 67 between 2013 and 2040 for women and from 65 to 
67  between 2013 and 2020 for men. The retirement age will be 
raised by three months each year.26
Finally, further reforms were adopted in 2013, including the 
 following changes:
  The FDC contribution rate will be fixed at 2.92% without any 
future changes.
  51.5% of FDC assets will be taken over by the general govern-
ment and booked on the second NDC scheme.
  The FDC scheme will no longer be obligatory.
  A new mechanism of the FDC-related pensions will be 
 introduced: Starting ten years before reaching the statutory 
 retirement age, the FDC assets will be cashed at a rate of 10% 
annually and gradually cumulated on the respective individual 
second NDC account.
In 2060 Norway will be the country with the lowest 
proportion of elderly people. In contrast, about one-third 
of the population will be 65 years and older in Germany 
and Poland.
Over the coming decades, the share of elderly people will 
rise sharply in Poland and is expected to be more than 
two and a half times larger in 2060 than it was in 2010.
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Germany
In Germany, there is a mandatory PAYG scheme to which pri-
vate sector employees have to contribute a certain rate of their 
income (18.9% in 2010) up to an annually adjusted threshold.27 
Payments are made by the employer and the employee in equal 
parts. In 2001 a voluntary, fully-funded system with tax credits 
was introduced. Workers can contribute up to 4% of their income 
to this so-called “Riester-Rente”. At the same time, an upper limit 
was set to contributions to the mandatory PAYG scheme (20% 
until 2020, 22% until 2030).
By contributing to the mandatory scheme people earn pension 
points, with one point corresponding to one year of average earn-
ings. The benefits are calculated as the product of accumulated 
points and the differing point values after retirement. The value 
of one pension point is annually adjusted to the growth of gross 
wages minus pension contributions and notional contributions 
to the “Riester-Rente”. Furthermore, a sustainability factor was 
introduced which anchors the point value to the ratio of contrib-
utors to retirees.
The regular retirement age will be raised to 67 years between 2012 
and 2031, with a possibility for early retirement after the age of 
60, which has been raised to 63 since 2006. There is a penalty of 
0.3 percentage points per month for early retirement and a bonus 
of 0.5 percentage points per month for late retirement.
In 2014 the most recent reform took place, enabling members of 
certain cohorts to retire at the age of 63 without any reductions in 
benefits if they have been working for 45 years.28
Summing up, Table 2 gives an overview over the earnings-related 
pension systems in Norway, Poland and Germany.
Table 2: Pension systems in Norway, Poland and Germany29
Measuring sustainability
The methodology of Generational Accounting30
In the following, the method of Generational Accounting will be 
applied to analyse whether the reforms described above can im-
prove intergenerational balance in the respective pension system, 
and which generations bear the burden of these reforms – given 
that “intergenerational redistribution occurs whenever a govern-
ment policy expands the consumption opportunities of one gen-
eration at the expense of another.”31
Generational Accounting was originally developed by Alan 
 Auerbach, Jagadeesh Gokhale and Laurence Kotlikoff in the early 
1990s to project the long-term development of public finances.32 
It is a micro-founded macro-model which attempts to measure 
both fiscal sustainability on the macro- and intergenera tional 
 redistribution on the micro-level. The intertemporal budget 
 constraint over an infinite time horizon marks the starting point 
of Generational Accounting.33 
D denotes the agents’ maximum age and b the base year.  Nb,k rep-
resents the present value of year b’s net tax payments (i.e. transfers 
minus contributions),34 made over the remaining life cycle by all 
members of a generation born in a specific year k. Thus the first 
term on the left-hand side of (1) represents aggregate net taxes of 
all generations alive in the base year b. The second term aggregates 
the net tax payments made by future generations born in year 
b + 1 or later. Together, these two terms have to be equal to Bb, 
which stands for the net debt35 of the pension sys-
tem in year b. Thus, if living generations receive 
a net transfer and if the net debt is positive, this 
will have to be financed by the net taxes of future 
generations.36
The calculation of net tax payments includes sev-
eral components. Firstly, all different kinds of con-
tributions are summed up and set off against dif-
ferent transfer types. Thereby, fiscal policy in place 
in the base year is assumed to be constant over the 
projection horizon. Furthermore, the summation 
of net tax payments is conducted separately for 
male and female individuals to account for gen-
der-specific profiles of contribution payment and 
benefit reception. The projection of future net tax 
payments also takes into account the number of 
cohort members who survive until each year un-
der consideration. Therefore long-term population 
forecasts are applied.
For living and future generations, a cohort’s Gen-
erational  Account  (GAb,k) in a specific year is de-
fined by dividing the aggregate remaining lifetime 
net payments by the number of cohort members 
alive in that year (Pb,k):
[Generational accounting] is a micro-founded 
macro-model which attempts to measure both fiscal 
sustainability on the macro- and intergenerational 
 redistribution on the micro-level.
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Generational Accounts are constructed in a purely forward-look-
ing way; only the contributions paid and the transfers received in 
or after the base year are considered. In consequence, Generat-
ional Accounts cannot be compared across living generations as 
they incorporate effects of different lifetimes. However, Genera-
tional Accounts of agents born in the base year and in the future 
can be compared, as both are observed over their entire life cycle.
Intertemporal public liabilities (IPL) arise when the intertemporal 
budget constraint of pension systems is violated:
The amount of intertemporal public liabilities measures aggregate 
unfunded claims on future budgets, assuming that the present 
policy will hold for the future. The Sustainability Gap is now de-
rived by setting intertemporal public liabilities in relation to the 
base year’s GDP:
On the one hand, the Sustainability Gap can easily be interpreted 
as comparable to the Maastricht criteria (however, it accounts for 
both debt incurred in the past as well as in the future). On the 
other hand, results are highly sensitive to changes in underlying 
assumptions, especially the difference between growth and inter-
est rate and demographic scenarios.
This drawback can be overcome by applying alternative indicators, 
which close the Sustainability Gap over a certain time horizon.37 
Benz and Fetzer38 show that the strong interpretation of the Sus-
tainability Gap in a Generational Accounting framework such as 
ours can easily be transferred into other methods assessing fiscal 
sustainability, like the OECD method or econometric approaches.
The question at hand is if there is at all a relation between the 
Sustainability Gap and intergenerational balance or even inter-
generational justice. Perhaps the Ponzi game, if played by govern-
ments, could be played for eternity? As regards Germany, current 
debt levels are obviously not punished by financial markets, which 
would be at least an indication that the Ponzi game could not be 
going on for ever. Take Japan as another example, which has al-
ready accumulated an official debt of over 250% of GDP and still 
enjoys an A rating on its bonds. However, these may be exceptions 
which prove the rule. Reinhart and Rogoff for example39 show in 
their prominent work that countries exceeding certain values of 
public debt are reducing their growth potential. Therefore some 
generations have to pay a certain share of the Sustainability Gap, 
or in other words the intertemporal budget constraint is binding.
Theoretical and empirical limitations
On the theoretical level, one of the major objections towards 
Generational Accounting is the question whether or not the 
underlying neoclassical life-cycle hypothesis holds. Neoclassical 
theory assumes that individuals plan and allocate resources over 
their entire life.40 This also underlies Generational Accounting, 
as net tax payments are calculated over the remaining life cycle. 
However, if the individual planning horizon was much shorter or 
longer, implications of Generational Accounting results could be 
misleading. Empirical evidence shows that individuals are neither 
purely short-sighted (if they were, voluntary long-term savings 
would not occur) nor perceive their families as infinitely living 
dynasties (if this was the case, intergenerational redistribution due 
to fiscal policy would be offset by bequests).41 Thus, while the ne-
oclassical life-cycle hypothesis does not perfectly describe reality, 
it seems to strike a fairly good balance.
Another drawback is that Generational Accounting is a partial 
equilibrium analysis and thus does not account for macroeconomic 
feedback effects.42 This would only be possible in a dynamic general 
equilibrium model. Thus the incidence of e.g. an increase in contri-
bution rates cannot be measured correctly. Therefore Generational 
Accounting is not able to provide a base for welfare judgements.
Regarding empirical limitations, the most severe one is the use of 
single growth and discount rates.43 The discount rate incorporates 
both the cost of waiting and the risk of future payment streams. 
Actually, this should be reflected in different rates. Furthermore, 
the choice of growth and discount rates is more or less arbitrary. 
However, the outcome of Generational Accounting mostly de-
pends on the difference between growth and discount rates, 
which seems to be fairly stable over time.44
Furthermore, it can be criticised that Generational Accounting 
holds constant age- and gender-specific tax- and transfer-pro-
files.45 However, increasing female labour market participation 
or the overall prolonging of working life due to augmented re-
tirement ages affect these profiles. Furthermore, Generational Ac-
counting does not incorporate private intergenerational transfers 
(which might cushion fiscal policy). The setting-up of so-called 
National Transfer Accounts tries to overcome these limitations. 
National Transfer Accounts are based on the System of National 
Accounts but estimate age-specific profiles for income, consump-
tion and savings; sometimes even for time-use.46
Finally, the projection of demographic developments, which have 
a major influence on the results of Generational Accounting, is 
deterministic. Again, including stochastic elements could miti-
gate this point of criticism. Another remedy comes from carrying 
out sensitivity analyses, which is also useful to oppose criticism 
concerning the choice of growth and discount rates.47
Generational Accounting faces important limitations both apply-
ing to forecasts in general and to this method in specific. Howev-
er, one important advantage of Generational Accounting is that 
it shows the effects of prolonging base-year’s fiscal policy into the 
future. Thus the results of Generational Accounting can be seen as 
a worst-case scenario and can serve as a warning to policy-makers. 
It can also be shown that Generational Accounting is a valuable 
method when the number of countries which apply this method 
Generational Accounts cannot be compared across living 
generations as they incorporate effects of different life-
times. However, Generational Accounts of agents born in 
the base year and in the future can be compared as both 
are observed over their entire life cycle.
On the theoretical level, one of the major objections to-
wards Generational Accounting is the question whether 
or not the underlying neoclassical life-cycle hypothesis 
holds.  Neoclassical theory assumes that individuals plan 
and  allocate resources over their entire life.
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is considered. A respective table can be provided by the authors 
upon request.
Limitations in scope48
The method of Generational Accounting was developed to assess 
long-term sustainability of public finances. However, with this 
 focus the important issue of adequacy may fall from view. The 
significance of adequate benefits can nicely be illustrated by look-
ing at public pension systems and the reforms undertaken in this 
field during the past few years.
Until the 1990s, public pensions became more generous, both 
in terms of the amounts paid as well as in terms of the period 
that could be enjoyed in retirement. Facing severe demographic 
changes, securing the long-term sustainability of pension systems 
became an important issue. Reforms enacted in this context often 
focused on defined contribution schemes and prefunding. They 
were thus designed to unfold their positive effect on sustainabil-
ity in the medium to long run. However, in the course of the 
financial crisis starting in 2008, many European countries faced 
large budget deficits and were pressured severely. They were forced 
to enact reforms with short-term effects. Thus the focus on pen-
sion reforms shifted to measures like raising the pensionable age, 
restricting access to early retirement options or cutting pension 
indexation. Often these reforms did not grant generous grand-
fathering regulations but rather applied to current pensioners 
as well. Furthermore, these reforms reinforced the link between 
retirement benefits and labour market outcomes. Employability 
and chances to find and hold a job providing sufficient and secure 
income will thus become more important in the future. Reaching 
this goal may be easier for some parts of the population than for 
others. However, the Generational Accounting analysis does not 
account for these kinds of distributional issues.
Besides pension reforms enacted during the crisis, protecting peo-
ple from old-age poverty and securing a decent living standard is 
and will remain a genuine task of public pension policy. However, 
these reform measures nicely illustrate the trade-off which may 
occur between adequacy and sustainability. To provide adequate 
pensions, increasing benefit levels may become necessary at some 
time in the future. Guarantee of income security in old age and 
protection against poverty might be difficult, if lowering benefits 
was the only way to ensure fiscal sustainability. There may not 
only be a trade-off between adequacy and sustainability, but the 
two goals may also be intertwined. Inadequate pension benefits 
will harm long-term financial sustainability as earlier or later pol-
icy reversals will become necessary. Thus an appropriate balance 
between adequacy and sustainability should be pursued.
General assumptions and data description
Presumed life expectancy determines the duration of payment of 
pension annuities. Therefore it is a main input factor for the as-
sessment of fiscal sustainability. Our assumptions on the future 
development of life expectancy are based on the demographic 
projection of Eurostat, EUROPOP2010.49 This guarantees a har-
monised set of assumptions for cross-country comparison. Data 
on future fertility rates and migration development are also taken 
from EUROPOP2010.
Expected wage growth considerably determines the level of future 
pension benefits, as all three schemes incorporate this figure both 
in the adjustment of accrued pension rights and in the indexation 
of pension benefits. In recent years wage growth was relatively 
heterogeneous across the three countries. We will consider these 
heterogeneous wage growth paths in our calculations and apply 
the productivity assumptions of the Ageing Working Group50 
(AWG).51 Thereby, it is assumed that wages grow in line with la-
bour productivity per hour. For Norway, this means that for the 
next decade wage growth will amount to 1.7%, while from 2025 
on, this figure will fall to 1.5%. In Germany, wage growth started 
at 0.9% in 2010 and is predicted to rise slowly until it reaches the 
target value of 1.5% in 2025. Figures are projected to be much 
higher in Poland. Starting from 2.5% in 2010, 2.9% was predict-
ed to be reached in 2015. Hereafter, wage growth will slow down, 
albeit on a very smooth path, so that it will still amount to 2.0% 
by 2045. Only in 2060 will the 1.5% mark be reached.
When it comes to choosing the interest rate, we also follow the 
AWG and apply a 3% interest rate in real terms, which reflects 
more or less the average bond yields of past decades.
While the AWG focuses on future pension expenditure, we extend 
this perspective by incorporating the revenue side in our calculations 
as well. For that reason, we use age- and gender-specific contribu-
tion profiles, which are weighted with our demographic projections 
and adapted to economic forecasts. Furthermore, we take into ac-
count that in Norway, for example, there are no specific pension 
contributions and that often a proportion of pension expenditure 
is financed via the tax revenues of the general government. Usually, 
selected non-contributory periods, such as times of child care or 
unemployment, are credited in the benefit formula and funded by 
tax inflows into the pension scheme budget. Therefore we addition-
ally estimate future tax payments – assuming that these expenses are 
covered by revenues from value added tax, as the value added tax is 
levied in every country and has a very broad tax base.
The above section, which described the institutional settings, 
showed that in each of the three countries important reforms took 
place regarding the retirement age. While in Poland and Germany 
retirement age is legislated to rise, in Norway a fixed retirement 
age of 67 years has been abandoned in favour of a flexible regula-
tion making retirement possible from 62 years on. Now, through 
this flexibility many persons could be tempted to retire as early as 
possible.52 However, as the direct effect of early retirement for the 
pension system is covered by actuarially fair discounts, we abstract 
from possible early retirement. Effects on the labour market and 
therefore on taxes and transfers are thus not covered by our ap-
proach. For Poland and Germany, increases in retirement age are 
reflected in our calculations according to legislation.53
In the above description of institutional settings, pension reforms 
enacted until spring 2014 were taken into account to display as 
complete a picture as possible. For the sake of comparability be-
tween the three countries, the following results will however only 
entail reforms which had already become law by September 2011. 
At this point in time, the redesign of pension rules had largely 
Inadequate pension benefits will harm long-term finan-
cial sustainability as earlier or later policy reversals will 
become necessary. Thus an appropriate balance between 
adequacy and sustainability should be pursued.
The results of Generational Accounting can be seen  
as a worst-case scenario and can serve as a warning to 
policy-makers.
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been completed in Norway and Germany. In Poland, important 
reforms were enacted in 2013. Thus, to be able to compare the 
Polish pension system to the other two systems, these reforms are 
included in the projections.
Sustainability gains of pension reforms in comparison
The concept of Sustainability Gaps can help to show the overall 
effect of pension reforms by comparing the Sustainability Gap 
of a country before and after a reform. If a reform reduces the 
 Sustainability Gap, this means that it is beneficial from the per-
spective of intergenerational balance, as the burden which has to 
be borne by future generations shrinks. In the following, Sustain-
ability Gaps before and after the reforms are estimated for Nor-
way, Germany and Poland.
The overall impact
Before the intergenerational distribution of the burden induced 
by pension reforms is analysed, a glance at the overall impact of 
these reforms may be worthwhile. The large impact of the Nor-
wegian pension reform is clearly visible in Figure 2. The Sustaina-
bility Gap was almost cut in half from 277.7% of GDP to 144%. 
This result holds if the assets from the Norwegian Government 
Pension Funds are taken into account. In 2010 these assets were 
worth 103.8% of GDP. However, in our calculations we do not 
include the value of the oil and gas reserves. In theory, one could 
also add the present value of oil and gas reserves, which would 
significantly decrease the Sustainability Gap. From this regard, 
Norwegian pension policy could probably even be labelled sus-
tainable.54 Germany started from a lower level of 186% of GDP 
and will arrive at 18.7% eventually. Here it is taken into account 
that imbalances can be offset by a rise in the contribution rate.55 
Without this possibility, the Sustainability Gap would amount to 
90% of GDP instead of 18.7%. In contrast, the Polish system has 
more than closed the Sustainability Gap. Figures for Poland show 
that each new reform added to future surpluses. Eventually, these 
will amount to 100% of GDP. This is mainly because Poland cur-
rently faces a transition period from a pay-as-you-go system to 
a partially funded one. The transition is financed by current tax 
inflows projected for the future. Jabłonowski and Müller56 show 
that the Sustainability Gap would however, be positive, if it was 
assumed that in the future only contribution payments have to 
finance pension benefits. Thus the negative Sustainability Gap 
shows that in the future tax inflows of the current amount will 
probably not be necessary. However, without any tax inflows, the 
reforms enacted cannot render a pension system sustainable.57
Figure 2: The effect of pension reforms on the Sustainability Gap58
Comparing post-reform Sustainability Gaps in Norway, Poland 
and Germany, the Norwegian pension policy does not seem to 
be sustainable, i.e. it seems as if in Norway future generations 
will have to bear a larger burden than current generations do. Yet, 
applying the concept of Sustainability Gaps, one has to bear in 
mind that cross-country comparison is applicable only to a lim-
ited extent, e.g. because of different demographic developments 
in each country. Demographic developments determine a coun-
try’s future economic power and thus the ability to pay debts. 
For countries with increasing population numbers (Norway) the 
economic power differs from countries with declining population 
numbers (Germany and Poland).59
However, insofar as populations grow mainly due to migration, 
the integration of immigrants is crucial for the impact of migra-
tion on the pension system’s sustainability. For example, Frassi et 
al.60 show for Italy that the Sustainability Gap can be closed with 
the help of immigration if integration is successful. In contrast, 
Bahnsen et al.61 show that forced migration to Germany in 2015 
had a negative impact on the overall Sustainability Gap.62
The impact of pension reforms on intergenerational burden-shar-
ing can be made visible through Generational Accounts. They 
set aggregate remaining lifetime net payments in relation to the 
size of a corresponding cohort. Figure 3 shows Generational Ac-
counts before and after the pension reforms for Norway, Germa-
ny and Poland. The sinusoidal pattern that can be observed in 
the German and the Polish figure is very common in countries 
with strong pay-as-you-go systems. The younger generations, up 
to the age of 35, finance the older generations. In the Norwegian 
figure, Generational Accounts are only positive for very young co-
horts close to the newborns. This means that in the course of their 
remaining life cycle almost everyone will receive more pension 
benefits than they will contribute to finance the system.
The comparison shows that in Norway and Germany, almost 
every cohort has to contribute to the reduction of the Sustaina-
bility Gap. In Poland, younger cohorts have to contribute while 
older ones do not. Thus, from the perspective of intergenerational 
balance, it seems as if the reforms in Germany and Norway were 
more equalised than in Poland.
Demographic developments determine a country’s fu-
ture economic power and thus the ability to pay debts.
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Figure 3: Generational accounts before and after the pension reforms63
As Generational Accounts are strictly forward-looking, a compar-
ison (of Generational Accounts) for living generations is not pos-
sible. Thus, for a thorough analysis of intergenerational balance, 
another indicator is necessary.
Who bears the burden of reforms?
Using the method of Generational Accounting can help to make 
intergenerational distributional effects of pension reforms visible. 
This is done in a first step by calculating Generational Accounts 
before and after a reform for every single cohort. Secondly, for a 
comparison between cohorts, the resulting differences in Gener-
ational Accounts before and after a reform are expressed as an-
nuities per cohorts. Thus it can be shown which cohort bears the 
largest burden of a particular pension reform. For example, the 
Norwegian newborns have a close to zero Generational Account 
in the new system. This means that, over their life cycle, taxes paid 
and transfers received will neutralise. In the old system, they re-
ceived a significant net transfer from the pension system. Thus the 
burden analysis shows that the newborns contribute significantly 
to reducing the Sustainability Gap of the pension system. The 
results of this burden analysis are shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Induced burden of pension reforms per cohort in annuities64
In the Norwegian case, the burden of cohorts aged 65 and 70 
catches the eye. It is relatively high and it is the largest of all co-
horts. Here, the impact of a change in indexation rules is clearly 
visible.65 Thus, for the Norwegian case, the suspicion does not 
hold that pension policy favouring current beneficiaries is enacted 
at the expense of younger generations. In contrast, cohorts ap-
proaching retirement bear the smallest burden. This pattern has 
different reasons. Firstly, the transition period protects genera-
tions still working but close to retirement age from the full effect 
of the longevity adjustment factor.66 Those with 47 years of age 
are the first fully affected cohort. Nevertheless, they are better-off 
than their older counterparts, as discounting reduces their losses 
in present value. Younger cohorts are also worse off. This is due 
to the increasing life expectancy of these cohorts. In the old pen-
sion system, increasing life expectancy meant increasing benefits 
in present value terms. The linking of benefits to life expectancy, 
as in the new system, reverses this gain into a loss.67
As regards Germany, the burden is distributed more equally across 
the generations. The particularly large cohorts (the baby boom-
ers), in 2010 aged around 50 years, bear a larger part of the bur-
den than their Norwegian counterparts. On the other hand, in 
Norway pensioners contribute to bearing the burden to a larger 
extent than in Germany. German pension reforms mostly affected 
younger cohorts and protected those who were already retired. In 
the Polish case, figures are much smaller due to the fact that the 
pension system is actuarially quite fair. Recent reforms have raised 
contributions but at the same time, accrued pension rights went 
up as well.
Overall, Figure 4 shows that the burden induced by pension 
reforms in the three countries considered is distributed differ-
ently. In Norway current pensioners bear quite a large share of 
the burden. In contrast, pension policy seems to favour current 
Using the method of Generational Accounting can help 
to make intergenerational distributional effects of pen-
sion reforms visible. This is done in a first step by calcula-
ting Generational Accounts before and after a reform for 
every single cohort.
Intergenerational Justice Review
2/2017
72
beneficiaries at the expense of younger generations in Poland and 
Germany.
Conclusion and outlook
In this paper we applied the method of Generational Account-
ing, which can reveal whether today’s government policy burdens 
future generations with a heavier load than current generations. 
Thus, with this focus on measuring intergenerational balance, we 
approached the vast field of intergenerational justice. We analysed 
pay-as-you-go pension systems and their reforms, as these systems 
by design chain different generations through rights and duties.
Our results showed that first of all, in the three countries con-
sidered, pension reforms could reduce the Sustainability Gap. 
This means that pension systems became more balanced in an 
intergenerational sense as the implicit debt which has to be paid 
(or at least serviced) by future generations was reduced. A more 
thorough analysis revealed that the burden of pension reforms is 
shared differently in the three countries. In Norway current pen-
sioners also have to contribute to enhancing the financial sustain-
ability of the pension system. In contrast, Poland and Germany 
seem to protect current pensioners at the expense of younger gen-
erations.
However, we also pointed out that Generational Accounting is 
not able to take into account the important issue of adequacy. 
When it comes to pension reforms, sustainability is an important 
constraint, especially regarding intergenerational fairness. While 
sustainability can be measured by Generational Accounting, ad-
equacy cannot. However, the latter concept is also important, as 
at least in democratic societies, fiscal sustainability alone is not 
sufficient for a sustainable pension system. Without acceptable 
adequacy, the pension system is not politically viable, as the medi-
an voter will become older and therefore make adequate pensions 
a political priority.68 Therefore, while fiscal sustainability may be a 
helpful yardstick to establish sensible policies, it is important not 
to lose sight of adequacy.
In our case studies, with Poland as an example we were  able to 
show that fiscal sustainability might be achieved at a high price. 
Recent pension reforms have led to financially sound systems, but 
at the same time it is questionable whether these systems will be 
able to grant adequate pension benefits in the future. Therefore 
the question arises: will reforms be enforced as they were legislated 
or will a governmental intervention become necessary? Political 
pressure on pension systems is already high and it can be guessed 
that it will rather increase than decrease in the future.69 Today it 
is already apparent that resisting this pressure is not always what 
politicians want. The case of Germany can serve as an example 
here: after more than a decade of exemplary pension reforms, the 
Merkel government decided to take a step back by re-introducing 
early-retirement channels. The situation is even more severe in 
Poland, where large parts of the pension reform have been with-
drawn.
The success of pension reforms is highly dependent on whether 
people accept them and adapt to them or not. Thus a transparent 
reform process and a broad approval of reform steps taken might 
be helpful to create a pension system that is not only sustainable 
and guarantees adequate benefits but is also politically stable.
The diversification of risks can support the overall stability of old-
age income provision. It can be reached by establishing a mul-
ti-pillar system of old-age income.70 In the countries considered 
here, an expansion to more than one pillar was part of recent 
reforms. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that second and 
third pillars can only cushion reductions in public pension sys-
tems if they cover as many parts of the population as these systems 
do. In putting more weight on second and third pillars, politicians 
have to make sure that pension provision granted by these pillars 
is affordable for as large a part of the population as possible. This 
holds especially for those who would be exposed to the risk of 
being poor by relying on public pensions only. In the end, the 
question boils down to the appropriate mixture of both pay-as-
you-go and funded parts of old-age provision. In our mind, to 
abolish public pension systems altogether would for sure not be 
intergenerationally justifiable. In the end, to have real sustainable 
reform, sustainability alone is the necessary (while adequacy being 
the sufficient) condition.
Our results show that while it may be impossible to have a numer-
ical (hence positive) measurement of intergenerational justice, the 
societal debate about such questions is more than ever important. 
Despite all its limitations, the method of Generational Account-
ing can contribute to this debate by revealing whether current 
policy is intergenerationally balanced in a sense that it does not 
load a heavier burden on future generations than on current ones. 
Additionally, it can be shown which generation has to bear the 
largest share of reform-induced burdens. Therefore Generational 
Accounting may be a valuable instrument to assess the merits and 
downsides of different policy alternatives. However, for a compre-
hensive picture, it has to be complemented by other assessments.
Notes
1 We are grateful to Katharina Saunders, Stefan Seuffert and three 
anonymous reviewers for valuable comments.
2 Hardach 2006: 5 even supposes that the focus of distributional 
issues will be on generations in the 21st century (having been on 
class and gender in previous centuries).
3 Norwegian Ministry of Finance 2017: 9.
4 For an overview see Tremmel 2008 and especially Tremmel 
2012.
5 Rawls 2001: 160.
6 For a more detailed discussion, see Hüther 2008.
7 Börsch-Supan 2003: 224, own translation.
8 See Vanhuysse 2013.
9 See Leach/Broeks/Østensvik/Kingman 2016.
10 Auerbach/Kotlikoff/Leibfritz 1999: 4.
11 This argumentation follows Börsch-Supan 2003: 225.
12 Auerbach/Kotlikoff/Leibfritz 1999: 3.
13 Auerbach/Kotlikoff/Leibfritz 1999: 6.
14 See Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and 
Inclusion and Social Protection Committee 2015. Pension ex-
penditure also enters both the European Intergenerational Fair-
In Norway current pensioners bear quite a large share of 
the burden. In contrast, pension policy seems to favour 
current beneficiaries at the expense of younger genera-
tions in Poland and Germany.
The success of pension reforms is highly dependent on 
whether people accept them and adapt to them or not.
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smaller than the discount rate. Thus deficits can exist in the long 
run. However, they have to be serviced.
37 Tepe/Vanhuysse 2012 point to the important issue of timing 
reforms. Therefore, probably, also the variety of less-sensitive in-
dicators towards economic variables may have different political 
sensitivity.
38 See Benz/Fetzer 2006.
39 See Reinhart/Rogoff 2010.
40 The so-called life-cycle theory was established by Modigliani/
Brumberg 1954.
41 Empirical analyses were for example conducted by Mello/
Kongsrud/Price 2004, Reitschuler/Cuaresma 2004 and Kotlikoff 
2004.
42 This was put forward by Börsch-Supan 2001.
43 This critique is extensively debated in CBO 1995.
44 See Fetzer 2006.
45 An extensive review of Generational Accounting can be found 
in Haveman 1994, where the issue of constant profiles is also dis-
cussed.
46 A detailed description of National Transfer Accounts can 
be found in United Nations 2012 and d’Albis/Moosa 2015. 
Hsieh/Tung 2016 use National Transfer Accounts within a 
Generational Accounting framework to assess the intergenera-
tional burden-sharing of the Taiwanese public pension system. 
Gál/Vanhuysse/Vargha 2018 show that as soon as private in-
tergenerational transfers of both cash and time are accounted 
for, children actually receive more per capita resources than the 
elderly.
47 It can also be mentioned that the base-year’s budget might be 
influenced by business cycle effects. This might have an important 
effect, as Generational Accounting analysis starts from the base-
year and projects base-year values into the future. However, Benz/
Hagist 2007 could show that the effect is rather small.
48 This section draws on Directorate-General for Employment, 
Social Affairs and Inclusion and Social Protection Committee 
2015.
49 For more details see Eurostat 2011.
50 The Ageing Working Group was commissioned by the Eco-
nomic Policy Committee of the European Union to improve the 
quantitative assessment of the long-term sustainability of public 
finances. In this regard the AWG published the Ageing Report 
in 2009, 2012 and 2015. The long-term projections underlying 
the Ageing Report assume that in all countries labour productiv-
ity growth will converge to 1.5% in the long run. To model the 
convergence path, it is assumed that countries where GDP per 
capita is low at present will display a higher potential for catching 
up. As the GDP per capita is currently below the EU average in 
Poland, the catching-up process is modelled via higher growth 
rates in the near future. For more details see Directorate-General 
for Economic and Financial Affairs and Ageing Working Group 
2011: 121-128.
51 For the country-specific assumptions see Directorate-General 
for Economic and Financial Affairs and Ageing Working Group 
2012.
52 Indeed, Brinch/Vestad/Zweimüller 2015 show that due to the 
Norwegian pension reform claiming pensions at the age of 62 
became more likely.
53 For Germany, we included the step-by-step increment of the 
retirement age up to 67 but not the most recent reforms which 
ness Index and the Intergenerational Justice Index.
15 Hardach 2006 provides a comprehensive insight into the his-
torical development of the generational contract in Germany.
16 Thereby, Generational Accounting contributed substantially 
to unveil this.
17  Source: EUROPOP2010, own illustration.
18 As forecasts about migration are highly speculative, this factor 
is not looked at in detail in the subsequent estimations. For the 
assumptions on migration applied later in our calculations see the 
corresponding section below.
19 Data from Eurostat database 2014, table tsdde230.
20 Source: own calculation based on EUROPOP2010
21 For a more detailed description see Pedersen 2012.
22 As the reformed pension system has been in operation since 
2011 only, the former system is still quite important. Persons 
born in 1953 and earlier are entirely covered by the former sys-
tem. For persons born in 1963 and later the new system applies; 
those born in between are covered by both systems.
23 Besides these components of the public pension system, about 
50% of all private sector employees are covered by the so-called 
AFP-arrangement, which from 2011 on is a lifetime top-up of the 
public earnings-related pension.
24 A detailed description of the NDC system in Poland can be 
found in Chlón-Dominczak/Góra 2006.
25 This part of the pension system is often referred to as the Fund-
ed Defined Contribution (FDC) part.
26 Nevertheless, the reform leaves special privileges granted in 
past decades unchanged, e.g. to miners, teachers or pre-retirement 
beneficiaries.
27 A detailed description of the German pension system can be 
found in Börsch-Supan/Wilke 2006.
28 However, this reform is not taken into account in the follow-
ing calculations.
29 Source: own illustration.
30 The following two sections draw heavily on Hagist 2008.
31 Kotlikoff 1999: 10.
32 See Auerbach/Gokhale/Kotlikoff 1994, 1992 and 1991. For a 
detailed and more formal description see Hagist/Raffelhüschen/
Risa/Vårdal 2013. For the demographic projections, we use Bonin 
2001’s projection program which is based on the component 
method proposed by Leslie 1945. The standard procedure has 
been extended to distinguish between genders and to incorporate 
immigration. Parameters like life expectancy and fertility change 
for every cohort according to the general trend.
33 Benz/Fetzer 2006 show that other assessment techniques use 
different time horizons, for example until one specific year or over 
a certain period of time. However, as these choices are rather ar-
bitrary and, therefore, at least in theory, the intertemporal budget 
constraint is not binding, we opt for the strict interpretation of 
Generational Accounting according to Raffelhüschen 1999.
34  In case public finances in general are assessed, all different 
types of taxes, contributions and transfers are considered.
35 However, in some countries – as for example Norway – 
there are large funds instead of a net debt. The Norwegian Gov-
ernment Pension Fund has a wide influence on pension system 
finances.
36 Auerbach/Kotlikoff 1999: 31 explain that the intertemporal 
budget constraint does not imply that debt has to be paid off at 
any date in the future. Rather, it requires debt to grow at a rate 
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introduced exceptions for long-term employees and higher pay-
ments for specific groups like mothers. For details about these re-
forms, and their impact on fiscal sustainability, see Hagist/Moog/
Raffelhüschen 2014.
54 For a calculation incorporating the present value of oil and gas 
reserves see Hagist/Raffelhüschen/Risa/Vårdal 2013.
55 In the German case, a possible increase in the contribution rate 
is taken into account, because it is restricted by law that the con-
tribution rate is allowed to grow at most up to 22% by 2030. Tak-
ing this increase into account can be viewed as a clearly defined 
benchmark scenario. In other countries, for example in Norway, 
such rules do not exist. Including general tax increases would be 
arbitrary as regards the amount of the increase. Therefore we do 
not take account of tax increases in situations in which they are 
not clearly defined in advance.
56 See Jabłonowski/Müller 2014: 26.
57 Vanhuysse 2013: 27 shows that current Polish policy strongly 
favours elderly cohorts. However, our long-term analysis shows 
that through the far-reaching reforms enacted, at least in the pen-
sion system, intergenerational balance can be achieved.
58 Source: own calculations.
59 There is always the question whether countries can outgrow 
their fiscal sustainability problems. As Holmøy 2006 shows this 
depends on the wage dependency of the expenditure side com-
pared to the revenue side of public coffers. In our case, pension 
benefits grow in most cases less than wages, which our model takes 
into account. Changing the level of wage growth only changes 
the results qualitatively if the discount rate is chosen below the 
growth rate. However, this is a dynamic inefficiency and therefore 
outgrowing the pension problem purely is not possible.
60 See Frassi/Hagist/Pammolli 2017.
61 See Bahnsen/Manthei/Raffelhüschen 2016.
62 Unfortunately, the degree of integration could not be included 
in the calculations of this paper. However, this would have been 
worthwhile especially in the cases of Norway and Poland. First of 
all, these two countries display very different migration patterns 
(as explained above). Second, migrants from Poland form by far 
the most important group of foreigners in Norway. Thus there is 
considerable room for future research.
63 There is always the question whether countries can outgrow 
their fiscal sustainability problems. As Holmøy 2006 shows 
this depends on the wage dependency of the expenditure side 
compared to the revenue side of public coffers. In our case, 
 pension benefits grow in most cases less than wages, which our 
model takes into account. Changing the level of wage growth 
only changes the results qualitatively if the discount rate is chosen 
below the growth rate. However, this is a dynamic inefficiency 
and therefore outgrowing the pension problem purely is not 
 possible.
64 Source: own calculations.
65 Indexing pensions in payment to a rate lower than wage 
growth leads to benefit losses, especially for those who are at the 
beginning of retirement because they face the longest period of 
benefits.
66 Why it is exactly these cohorts who were protected most, 
would be an interesting analysis on its own.
67 We model increasing life expectancy until 2060, which is why 
there is again a turn in the burden for the cohorts between 15 and 
20 years of age.
68  In the sense that in the future a majority will still be in favour 
of the system.
69 Actually, Tepe/Vanhuysse 2012 demonstrate that politicians 
in ageing societies seem rather to opt for medium-size pension re-
forms. Thus they seem to try avoiding larger reforms which would 
cause more opposition from the electorate and are therefore po-
litically riskier.
70 A detailed analysis of the different risks in pay-as-you-go and 
funded pension pillars and an estimation of the optimal mix of 
these two pillars is e.g. provided in Börsch-Supan 2005, Lind-
beck/Persson 2003 and Anders/Groneck 2017.
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